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ABSTRACT
¶1

At the moment, there is a debate between law enforcement and the technology
industry, on behalf of their users, about the whether technology companies should
provide backdoors or assistance when users encrypt their communications. Despite the
needs of law enforcement, backdoors or other unlocking measures can severely intrude
into consumer privacy interests. At the risk of losing evidence, privacy should be the
dominant concern, which has been supported by the Supreme Court noting that “privacy
comes at a cost”.1 Stephanie Pell and others have discussed the problems with current
statutes for privacy interests, but the discussions surrounding encryption technology are
a new issue that has not been closely covered by legal scholarship. This note uses a
privacy rights analysis to support technology companies’ arguments for noncompliance
with law enforcement requests to de-encrypt encrypted communications. As the debate
continues ahead, this note may provide support for consumer privacy against law
enforcement intrusion.
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INTRODUCTION
¶2

¶3

¶4

Imagine a police investigation. The police believe they will have a chance to
apprehend their target at a large sale they know through informants is going to occur
shortly. The police do not know the exact time and location of the sale, however. They
attempt a wiretap on the cell phones of relevant actors, but no information can be gleaned
from the wiretap. No one is using text messages, no phone calls regarding the sale come
through. The police believe the targets are using a service that encrypts their
communications, something as simple as iMessage on Apple products or the Skype
application on their phones. Running out of time, the police contemplate a warrant. Do
they get a warrant for the company, such as Apple, to turn over all communications from
certain accounts, or instead for the phones themselves? The company may reply they are
unable to comply with the warrant because the encryption also prevents the company
itself from retrieving information. So, the police are left to retrieve the phones
themselves, tipping off their targets that law enforcement is involved either through
notice to the owner of the phone or through an in-person search; likely preventing the
very event necessary for the arrest of their target, if it had not already occurred by the
time they were able to get warrants for the phones.
This situation highlights the current battle between effective law enforcement and
the right to privacy to one’s own communications. The issue has begun to arise more
often as technology companies, led by Apple and Microsoft, increasingly turn to
encryption to protect their users.2 For the moment, the Trump Administration has decided
not to force compliance, although the issue remains hotly debated between the
government and law enforcement,3 especially as the debate gained more coverage after
Apple refused to decrypt the phone of one of the shooters in the San Bernardino
massacre4. The wiretapping statues do not govern encrypted communications that run
through technology companies rather than phone companies, such as iMessage, Skype, or
WhatsApp. Technology companies do not always comply with wiretapping requests or
warrants, either because the relevant statute, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA), does not cover the communications or because the
companies are unable to comply due to encryption.
American law at the moment has not caught up with our current technology boom,
leading to a unique gap in case law. While wiretaps for technology companies remain
2
See Matt Apuzzo, David E. Sanger, & Michael S. Schmidt, Apple and Other Tech Companies
Tangle with U.S. over Data Access, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/us/politics/apple-and-other-tech-companies-tangle-with-us-overaccess-to-data.html [https://perma.cc/VYE5-G7DA]. See also, Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As
encryption spreads, U.S. grapples with clash between privacy, security, WASH. POST, (April 10, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-us-worries-about-accessto-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3ENN-MAUS].
3
See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Obama Won’t Seek Access to Encrypted User Data,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/us/politics/obama-wont-seek-access-toencrypted-user-data.html [https://perma.cc/7H9K-WLF6].
4
See Marie Andrusewicz, Apple Opposes Judge's Order To Help FBI Unlock San Bernardino
Shooter's Phone, NPR (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/02/17/467035863/judge-orders-apple-to-help-investigators-unlock-california-shooters-phone
[https://perma.cc/H7ZY-8SDC].
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difficult to pursue, there is a growing body of case law regarding tech companies’
compliance with warrants for phones, entire email accounts, Facebook profiles, and other
communicatory services. So far, the courts have generally ruled in favor of law
enforcement to the detriment of privacy rights, contractual agreements between the
companies and users, and congruence with international law.
This comment will address this gap in the law, and argue that privacy concerns
should govern the discussion regarding government access to communications. Section
One contains a primer on the right to privacy in the United States and its importance.
Section Two will introduce the relevant statutes required for wiretaps and warrants, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). The section will explain their purpose and also address
the Acts’ privacy rights shortcomings. Section Three will address the current circuit split
emerging over whether to issue warrants for items that include encrypted
communications, such as entire cell phones, or Facebook and email accounts. It will
argue that the split should be decided in favor of privacy rights, and that the dangers in
turning over all of a person’s communications outweigh the benefits even when there
may be information helpful to a criminal investigation. Section Four will discuss the
reasons why wiretaps for encrypted communications are not currently permitted or
executable in the United States. Section Five will synthesize the previous sections,
addressing how the law treats encrypted communications differently based on the type of
surveillance. Finally, Section Six will offer predictions about where the law around
encrypted communications is headed, and recommendations regarding the direction in
which it should go.

I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
¶6

The right to privacy in the United States derives from several sources, but is most
strongly supported for the purposes of this paper by the Fourth Amendment, which states:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized.5

¶7

The right to privacy in the Fourth Amendment is the right for citizens to have their bodies
and their things “secure” or remaining theirs, unless the search is reasonable. So, while
there is room for the government to access citizens’ “persons, houses, papers, and
effects,” it must be reasonable.6
The Supreme Court has spent much time defining what a reasonable search and
seizure is, and have shown through their decisions that privacy rights are to be taken

5
6

U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1.
Id.
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seriously, and not disregarded in favor of public safety. Privacy rights are given
precedence because they “impact[] fundamental values of a free society, such as freedom
of speech, association, and expression.”7 The court has emphasized privacy rights in its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, stating “[t]he security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police — which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment — is
basic to a free society.”8 In fact, Justice Roberts suggested privacy was an essential
reason for the American fight for independence from Britain in Riley v. California,
stating:
Our cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment was the founding
generation’s response to the reviled “general warrants” and “writs of
assistance” of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to
rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of
criminal activity. Opposition to such searches was in fact one of the
driving forces behind the Revolution itself.9
Simply stated, the Court looks to privacy interests first, not to governmental interest.10
The Court upholds this, even knowing that at times important evidence may be lost:
“our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement
to combat crime. Cell phones have become important tools in facilitating
coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises,
and can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous
criminals. Privacy comes at a cost.”11

¶8

The result is that even though privacy rights and law enforcement interests are weighed in
a balancing test in Fourth Amendment procedure, privacy concerns are paramount and
should only be invaded in rare circumstances.
The need to weigh more heavily on privacy interests is perhaps more important
now than it ever has been, because of the sheer amount of information that is stored on
cell phones. A single object such as a cell phone can provide access to a person’s
communications, location data, purchases, and any other activity conducted using that
technology. The access to this data needs to be limited in a meaningful way, for the
alternative is to have increased governmental invasion into the private sphere. The
government has responded in various ways to the increased need for delineation of
7
Agnieszka A. McPeak, Social Media, Smartphones, and Proportional Privacy in Civil
Discovery, 64 KAN. L. REV. 235, 257 (2015).
8
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
9
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014).
10
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“If letters and private documents can thus be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.”).
11
Riley, 134 S. Ct., at 2493.
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privacy rights. For example, the Obama Administration was the first to “explicitly
support comprehensive privacy legislation.”12 The Federal Trade Commission has also
become more interested in protecting privacy, requiring that major technology companies
like Facebook sign privacy consent decrees.13
Privacy law is essential to a functioning democracy, as it allows freedom of speech
and “is basic to a free society.”14 This paper claims privacy should be the governing
interest because it is so fundamental to the functioning of American society.

II. CONGRESS’ RESPONSE TO TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN THE ECPA AND CALEA
A. ECPA
¶10

The Electronic Communications and Privacy Act was passed in 1986, in response
to the advance of technology.15 The Act contains three sections: the Wiretap Act, the
Stored Communications Act, and the Pen Register Act.16 Prior to the Act’s passage, a
series of Supreme Court cases, the ‘business records cases,’ held that disclosure of
personal information to businesses was outside the scope of Fourth Amendment privacy
protection.17 This was problematic with the advent of email and other services, as
electronic communications require the user to share their information with the company
providing the service. In fact, the user may have to share their information multiple times
as it passes through different services, making a contemporaneous record of the
communication (as opposed to a phone call which is not replicable).18 With this risk to
privacy in mind, Congress passed the Act.
¶11
However, as technology has progressed, the Act has not protected privacy as much
as planned, because Congress focused on the different technologies operating at the time
rather than the common privacy interests they all shared.19 As others have argued, these
acts need to be reformed to address the advent of technology in the modern age.20
However, until that occurs, scholars and judges must use the statutes as they can to
protect privacy interests.
¶12
Two of the sections, the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register statute, protected
electronic communications in transit to some degree, but left broad authorizations such as

12
Peter Swire, Social Networks and the Law: Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of
Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1382 (2012).
13
Id.
14
Wolf, 333 U.S., at 8.
15
Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 977
(2008).
16
18 U.S.C. § 3127.
17
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1562 (2004).
18
Id. at 1562-63.
19
Robert Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and Interception of Email,
10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
20
Id. at 5.
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allowing interceptions based on any federal felony.21 Earlier communications statutes
restricted wiretaps only to certain crimes, but the ECPA has a much broader reach for law
enforcement and “the ECPA contains no statutory exclusionary rule for wrongfully
acquired electronic communications.”22 An exclusionary rule for wrongfully acquired
electronic communications allows one to suppress evidence from unlawful searches and
seizures; its absence from the ECPA burdens the suppression process.23 Even still, the
Wiretap Act has strong protections for electronic communications while they are in
transit, extending the protections of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, such as requiring a warrant before interception.24 These sections are not as
relevant to the analysis of encrypted communications as the Stored Communications Act
(SCA), so this comment will focus on that portion of the ECPA.
¶13
The Stored Communications Act is part of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, passed in 1986.25 The SCA was passed in part to limit the government from
requiring disclosure from third party providers of online services,26 although it also
identifies when law enforcement may gain access to stored communications.27 The Act
creates two categories of providers: Electronic Communication Service (ECS) providers
give users the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications, and Remote
Computing Service (RCS) providers give users computer storage or processing services
through electronic communications.28 If the provider is either an ECS or a RCS provider,
the government may access the communication through a search warrant without notice
to the user, or give notice to the user and get the communications through a subpoena.29 If
a third party is in neither category, then the communication cannot be disclosed.30 Today,
most third parties are in neither category, as they typically provide elements of both
categories to their users.
¶14
Since the Act was passed, the difference between these two categories has eroded,
as most modern technology provides both services.31 Neither ECS nor RCS providers
may disclose data in electronic storage, but the government may obtain electronic
communications in storage with ECS for less than 180 days through a warrant.32 The Act
does not require that the warrant outline the specific types of messages desired.33
¶15
For communications stored more than 180 days, the government can compel
disclosure through a search warrant, or a combination of a subpoena (administrative or
21

Mulligan, supra note 16, at 1566.
Id.
Orin Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would
Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 824 (2003).
24
Mulligan, supra note 16, at 1562.
25
Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored Communications
Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 375 (2009).
26
Ryan A. Ward, Discovering Facebook: Social Network Subpoenas and the Stored
Communications Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 563, 566 (2011).
27
Patricia Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1413
(2004).
28
Scolnik, supra note 24, at 376.
29
Bellia, supra note 26, at 1416.
30
Ward, supra note 25, at 567.
31
Scolnik, supra note 24, at 376.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 377.
22
23
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grand jury), with prior notice to the user.34 They may also get the information through
notice to the user and a court order authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which has a
reasonable suspicion standard for the believed relevancy of information sought, which is
lower than the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard.35 Some argue that the SCA
unintentionally provides that companies like Facebook disclose all content as long as
there is a subpoena, with less than probable cause.36
¶16
Stephanie Pell, a leading researcher in the area of government surveillance and
technology, argues that in spite of a general consensus that the SCA is out of date, the
legislature has been unable to pass a more modern act because they have not had accurate
information about the type of surveillance the government has used in secret.37 For
example, Congress has never authorized StingRay technology, which is used by law
enforcement to obtain detailed information of the location of cell phones without
collaboration with wireless companies.38 Congress cannot update surveillance statutes
properly because they do not always receive notice of new surveillance methods and
technologies being implemented by law enforcement.39
B. CALEA
¶17

The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) determines
the duties for telecommunications companies when they intercept communications at the
request of law enforcement through wiretaps and other means, but CALEA does not
determine the scope of government power to intercept communications.40 The companies
must provide the materials to allow the government to intercept wire and electronic
communications.41
¶18
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications came under the purview of
CALEA after traditional telephone systems started switching to VoIP and the FCC
broadened the Act.42 VoIP communications differ from the traditional systems because
the information is separated into packets, without requiring the circuit between the source
and the destination to be predetermined, or all the information to be sent through one

34
Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking Privacy
Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 360 (2011).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, and Less than a
Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law
Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 134, 154 (2014).
38
Id. at 142.
39
Id. at 143.
40
Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Construction and Application of Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 to 1010, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 323 §2
(2008).
41
Id.
42
See Christa M. Hibbard, Wiretapping the Internet: The Expansion of the Communications
Assistance to Law Enforcement Act to Extend Government Surveillance, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 371, 375
(2012).

81

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2017

switch.43 CALEA was originally written for companies to intercept calls at a single
switch between the responder and the caller, so the separation of the data would have
thwarted wiretaps until CALEA was updated.44
¶19
However, when CALEA was broadened to include VoIP, other internet
communications were intentionally kept out of the scope of the act.45 While the FBI
would like to expand CALEA to apply to internet communications providers, it would be
difficult for companies to comply for several reasons. The first is that the internet as a
structure would be difficult to create wiretap technology for, given its decentralized
nature46. Wiretap technology was created for the organized and relatively uniform
telecommunications industry, and the design of the internet does not map with
wiretapping technology as it currently exists.47 The second reason is that privacy rights
would be at risk48. The way information is sent through the internet makes it hard to get
particularized information specified in a warrant or wiretap order, increasing the
likelihood that unauthorized information may also be discovered, especially since people
tend to release private information on the internet.49
¶20
Constance Martin has explained CALEA’s difference from other legislation as “not
simply authoriz[ing] electronic surveillance . . . but requir[ing] telecommunications
operators to take any necessary measures to aid law enforcement.”50 Martin advocates
that CALEA was not intended for companies providing information services and that
extending CALEA to the internet went against both the language of the act and privacy
rights.51 She argues the legislative intent was a narrow statute “focused on traditional
phone lines,” and that internet and VoIP services should be exempt from CALEA.52
¶21
In sum, CALEA and the EPCA work together to enable law enforcement to look
into communications, although with varying levels of success and protection to citizens.
Because both statutes were enacted prior to the current age, they are ill fit for use either
by the citizen to protect their rights, or by law enforcement to conduct surveillance. These
gaps in the statutory law allow for different interpretations of what rights people have in
regards to their internet communications, which are addressed in the following section.

43
Timothy Singleton, Big Brother Hears You, But Can He Understand What He Hears? The
Problematic Application of CALEA to VoIP Communications in the Age of Encryption, 15 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 283, 287-88 (2008).
44
Id. at 286.
45
Hibbard, supra note 41, at 376.
46
Id. at 384.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 385.
49
Id. at 386-87.
50
Constance L. Martin, Exalted Technology: Should Calea Be Expanded to Authorize Internet
Wiretapping?, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 140, 144 (2005).
51
Id. at 156.
52
Id. at 157, 180.
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III. THE EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER WARRANTS FOR ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS
¶22

There is a split of authority emerging about whether warrants can be issued for an
entire phone, or an entire email account. Some courts believe that law enforcement is not
asking for access with sufficient particular language, but in many cases the issue does not
come up at all and warrants are issued without comment from the court. Courts are being
too cavalier with people’s privacy rights when they grant such generalized warrants, as
advances in technology should not reduce privacy protections.53
This issue was recently tried at the appeals level for the first time in the Microsoft
case and the court would not order the warrant and it is important later cases continue to
consider all the interests involved.54 People’s phones, email accounts, or Facebook
profiles contain much more than possibly relevant evidence. They contain private
financial information, health data, a multitude of personal communications, personal
thoughts, and more. The Supreme Court, in Riley v. California, indicated that cell phones
deserve extra privacy protections, and cannot be searched without a warrant because cell
phones hold the “sum of an individual’s private life,” rather than just isolated bits of
information like in times past.55 In light of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Riley, lower
courts should give cell phones increased privacy protections, by ensuring that warrants
that are issued are specific, since so much information is held on cell phones that should
not be easily accessible by law enforcement with probable cause only of drug trade, for
example. Pursuit of information regarding a drug deal should not allow access to private
photos, medical apps, or any other private information unrelated to the drug charge. This
is in keeping with past Supreme Court jurisprudence protecting residences due to the
amount of private information that may be held in a home56, analogous to a phone or
email account in today’s technological world.
A. Judges Grant Warrants for Encrypted Communications when they Consider the Cost
to Technology Companies

¶23

Despite Riley, some courts have granted warrants for encrypted communications on
suspects’ devices, even over challenges from the companies that host the
communications. Law enforcement is granted complete access to an entire account, when
the warrants should be denied based on vagueness. The Fourth Amendment demands that

53
See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49, (1967) (“The law, though jealous of individual
privacy, has not kept pace with these advances in scientific knowledge. This is not to say that individual
privacy has been relegated to a second-class position for it has been held since Lord Camden's day that
intrusions into it are ‘subversive of all the comforts of society.’”) (discussing advances in wiretap
technology).
54
In the Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2016).
55
Riley, 134 S. Ct., at 2495.
56
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714, (1984) (“At the risk of belaboring the obvious,
private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to
recognize as justifiable.”).
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warrants have “particularity.”57 The Supreme Court has stated that particularity
requirement in part, means that “warrants shall particularly describe the thing to be seized
[to make] general searches under them impossible and prevent[] the seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another.”58 Therefore vague warrants that do not set out the
content of messages or communications law enforcement believe will be present should
be denied.
¶24
For example, Facebook challenged a trial court ruling that it could not litigate the
constitutionality of warrants on its customers’ behalf.59 The state had issued 381 warrants
for Facebook users suspected of Social Security fraud.60 The appeals court upheld the
trial court ruling, saying that no party, including Facebook, had the right to quash a
warrant before it was issued.61 The court rejected Facebook’s argument that because the
company was the one who had to retrieve the information, the warrant was more akin to a
subpoena, which could be contested before it was carried out.62 The court said this would
cause any nontraditional search warrant to be unworkable.63 While the court was
concerned about privacy rights, the court determined that Facebook could not gain more
rights than a citizen, and that any evidence gained from the warrants could be suppressed
at a later time, rather than quashed pre-enforcement.64
¶25
In another case with a similar outcome, the court evaluated whether a warrant for
an entire email account hosted by Gmail was overbroad and concluded it was not.65 The
court looked to case law on warrants for entire hard drives, and found that the same
principles supported warrants for email accounts.66 The court also rejected the notion that
Google, as the host, should determine which emails were relevant to the warrant.67 They
believed the burden would have been too much for the company, and the simple solution
was to have entire Gmail accounts sent to law enforcement to comply with warrants.68
The court explicitly disagreed with other circuits, stating that the case law supported the
government’s warrant for an entire email account
¶26
The Facebook and Gmail cases are helpful to illustrate why courts are disregarding
established privacy rights in favor of surveillance law. Courts are concerned with how
relevant information will be determined from these sources, and do not want to burden
technology companies with sorting through the mass of information that might be
relevant to an investigation. This would be an unnecessary expense on business, and
could make companies less willing to work with law enforcement if they were required to
57
58
59

2015).

60

U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1.
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 132 A.D.3d 11, 13 (N.Y. App. Div.

Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-19.
63
Id. at 19.
64
Id. at 23.
65
In the Matter of a Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account
xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled By Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
66
Id. at 394.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 394-96.
61
62
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expend dollars in order to comply with privacy law. The courts also rely on the law of
evidence to protect privacy rights, stating that wrongly discovered information can be
later quashed.
¶27
The problem with this reasoning is that it assumes that the problems are not the
warrants themselves. A general warrant for an entire email account, without specifying
what type of communications law enforcement is looking for, will be very difficult to
later quash evidence from. The courts should be denying these types of warrants based on
vagueness. While a technology company may not be able to sort through an entire
account for the types of communications law enforcement is looking for, a particularized
warrant would at least make it obvious what can later be deemed as outside the scope of a
warrant. The danger is that there is no privacy when entire accounts are available to law
enforcement to find evidence without any parameters.
B. Judges Deny Warrants for Encrypted Communications if they Fear Loss to Privacy
Rights and Overbroad Warrants
¶28

Some courts recognize the danger to privacy, and have been denying overbroad
warrants for encrypted communications. This is the desired outcome for privacy interests,
as it encourages particular warrants, and reminds law enforcement that they do not have
access to an individual’s entire life or every communication.
¶29
In another case, the government sought warrants from “Google, Inc. (“Google”),
GoDaddy, Verizon Internet Services (“Verizon”), Yahoo!, and Skype (collectively,
“Providers”), to disclose copies of electronic communications — including the contents
of all emails, instant messages, and chat logs/sessions” regarding a suspect in an
interstate stolen property case.69 The court determined that emails should receive Fourth
Amendment protection, following the logic of case law that provided that warrants were
still required for letters when they were handed to third party mail carriers, or phone calls
which require a third party to transmit them.70 The court then found that the warrants
were too broad because they failed to set any limits on the information they were asking
for and they violated the Fourth Amendment.71 The court held the warrant “is best
analogized to a warrant asking the post office to provide copies of all mail ever sent by or
delivered to a certain address so that the government can open and read all the mail to
find out whether it constitutes fruits, evidence or instrumentality of a crime.”72
¶30
In another case, the district court rejected a warrant requesting to search a lawfully
seized cellular telephone, in part because the warrant requested indefinite storage of
encrypted data.73 The court worried that the government could then store an iPhone

69
In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Accounts/Skype
Accounts, No. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 2013 WL 4647554, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013).
70
Id. at 3-4.
71
Id. at 8.
72
Id.
73
In re Nextel Cellular Tel., No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 WL 2898262, at *11 (D. Kan. June 26,
2014); see also, In re Cellular Telephones, No. L4-MJ-8017-DJW, 2014 WL 7793690, at *6 (D. Kan. Dec.
30, 2014)(arguing that warrants for entire cell phones without a search protocol “would give the
government carte blanche to examine the entirety of an individual's digital presence with impunity”).
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owner’s “entire correspondence via iMessage indefinitely, much of which may lack
probable cause having no connection to the crimes being investigated.”74
¶31
Finally, illustrating the lack of consensus on these types of issues, a different
district court in New York initially declined to issue an order requiring Apple to disable
the encryption key on a suspect’s iPhone.75 While the court asked Apple to submit a
memo regarding if compliance with the order would be unduly burdensome, the language
of the order suggested they were hesitant to force Apple to comply.76 The court stated
that Congress is aware that there is a statutory gap in CALEA that prevents law
enforcement from forcing compliance with these types of orders, but that Congress has
not responded with any statutory update.77 Also, the court was sensitive to Apple’s
motivations to satisfy its consumers and their interests in personal privacy and data
security.78 The court echoed these arguments in its ultimate order, deciding not to issue
the order.79 The court’s analysis shows that some courts are properly weighing the right
to privacy and companies’ duty to respond to that need, rather than immediately deferring
to law enforcement. Further, Apple will probably be unable to comply with this order, as
they have argued in the San Bernardino case discussed below, as encryption purposefully
keeps information from the technology companies as well as others – its purpose is to
make information or communications impossible to access by anyone except the user.

IV. WIRETAPS FOR ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS – A DISPUTED ISSUE
¶32

There is not a lot of case law on this issue, because law enforcement does not
pursue wiretaps it cannot intercept.80 Therefore, there is currently a gap in authority
surrounding this issue, until there is statutory authority allowing or disallowing wiretaps
of encrypted communications. This section will explain why law enforcement is unable
to get wiretaps for encrypted communications, including technological hurdles, company
resistance, and Constitutional law.
A. Technological Difficulties to Intercept Live Encrypted Communications

¶33

Even determining where to set up a wiretap for a Voice-Over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) call is difficult. First of all, there is no way to determine exactly what ISP the
caller and receiver are calling from, since it would change depending on their locations.81
Even if that was possible, the ISPs cannot read the encrypted traffic of the VoIP call, so
74

See Nextel, 2014 WL 7793690, at *11.
In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this
Court, No. 15MC1902, 2015 WL 5920207, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015).
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Id. at *3.
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Id. at *6.
79
In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
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Steven M. Bellovin et. al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on
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no information would be transmitted.82 The VoIP providers may be in a different
jurisdiction, and are unable to see what traffic they provide.83 Therefore, even if the
government wanted to extend CALEA to internet communications, it would be extremely
difficult for the technology companies to be able to provide the infrastructure for
wiretaps.
¶34
Bellovin argues that even as technology improves, most criminals do not use
encryption, so fear of missing information is misplaced.84 However, he cautions that if
the Skype architecture, in which there is end-to-end encryption with no middle man,
becomes prevalent with other services, then wiretapping would become very difficult.85
Even Skype can provide location services, though, so law enforcement could gain some
information from Skype or Skype-model companies.86
¶35
Stephanie Pell offers a similar perspective, saying that the government has issues
“with wiretapping capabilities, not a lack of the legal authority to conduct surveillance”.87
There is no way to execute even a court-authorized wiretap for many of the encrypted
communications companies, because the companies “lack[] the technical capability to
implement” them, so law enforcement wants the legislature to encourage internet
communications companies not under CALEA’s purview to create interception
capabilities in their products.88 However, after Edward Snowden’s disclosures, Congress
is trepidatious to support surveillance, and law enforcement agencies are without a legal
outlet to get live information from internet companies not under CALEA.89
B. Technology Companies’ Increasing Reliance on Encryption
¶36

The technology companies also seem to want to distance themselves from law
enforcement, most notably through making encryption a default setting.90 Apple and
Google have made encryption default on their cellular phones, and one imagines many
other technology companies will follow suit.91 The result is that providers do not have the
information that law enforcement seeks, even if there is a search warrant or wiretap. As
the cases above show, these companies are also fighting law enforcement in court,
arguing on behalf of their users’ rights to privacy.
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V. WHY DOES THE LAW TREAT ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION DIFFERENTLY BASED ON
THE TYPE OF SURVEILLANCE?
A. Differences Between Wiretaps and Warrants for Encrypted Communications
¶37

Even before encrypted communications are implicated, there are substantial
differences between wiretaps and warrants. First of all, the scope of the searches are
different. A warrant application must show probable cause that the items will be found in
the location listed and allows a single search of the location.92 A wiretap must show
probable cause that specific communications in the future will be seized through a
specific telephone (or piece of technology), which allows law enforcement to listen as
many times as necessary for up to thirty days.93
¶38
The main difference is that the wiretap is unachievable with the current state of
technology, and the warrant may be able to give law enforcement information. However,
if the government is getting a warrant to receive the information from the tech
companies, the companies may not have access to the information sought because of
encryption. So, the only way law enforcement may then get access to the information
would be to examine the device the communications were sent from, if possible.
B. Similarities Between Wiretaps and Warrants for Encrypted Communications
¶39

Clifford Fishman argued that when law enforcement are issued warrants, “they
usually know as soon as they see an object whether it falls within the ambit of items
subject to seizure. If the police seize items not specified in the warrant or found in plain
view, such items are not admissible in evidence.”94 On the other hand, when law
enforcement use wiretaps, they are not able to tell whether the conversation is relevant to
the investigation immediately, or even part-way through.95
¶40
In our current climate where warrants for entire email accounts or phones are
granted in some states without thought, this distinction that Fishman describes is wearing
down. Law enforcement will not be able to tell immediately what is relevant to their
investigation if they are searching through an entire phone. There will be significant
information that will not be relevant, but will be highly personal to the suspect. The same
problems with privacy that concerned scholars in the 1970s now apply not only to
wiretaps, but to warrants as well.
¶41
Law enforcement is able, without knowing specifically whether a message will be
relevant, to peruse an entire email account, the equivalent of listening to every
conversation a suspect might have. While a wiretap may overhear some private
conversations, law enforcement officers must stop listening if the conversation is not
pertinent to the investigation, as per the minimization provision in Title III of the
92
Clifford S. Fishman, The "Minimization" Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title III, The
Fourth Amendment, and the Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 315, 317-18 (1979).
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Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which gives law enforcement the
right to wiretap but also constrains their ability to do so.96 However, in the situation of an
email account or phone messages, law enforcement may open a message and
immediately tell it is not relevant; but the act of opening the message is a breach of
privacy in that they become privy to information they would not have received otherwise.
Unlike a phone call in which they would have stopped recording when a suspect was
having a conversation that was not relevant, they have access to the entire email or
message as soon as it is opened, regardless of its relevance. Even if a similar constraint
was instituted to written communications (i.e. the first 3 lines of the email must be
relevant to the investigation), there is no way to ensure law enforcement would stop
reading after that point, unlike a recording which requires clear action on the part of the
officer. We are no longer only in the realm of search warrants for items, now warrants
open up people’s private thoughts and ruminations to law enforcement investigators.

VI. WHERE DOES THE LAW GO FROM HERE?
A. Predictions
¶42

Weinstein and his co-authors suggest that defense lawyers are in a unique position
with regard to wiretaps and warrants for evidence “collected using digital means.”97
Defense lawyers could move to suppress a wiretap for an internet company, arguing also
that the evidence underlying the wiretap, such as location information, should not be
admitted.98 Warrants for email accounts or cell phones can be attacked based on scope.99
¶43
Companies have also been litigating on behalf of their users and their privacy. In
the Microsoft case, a search warrant was issued to Microsoft for records for a specific
email account, but Microsoft moved to vacate on the premise that the warrant authorized
a search and seizure of content stored in Ireland.100 The district court determined that the
court order giving the warrant was not a final order and therefore Microsoft could not
appeal it so their case was “defective at this stage.”101 Microsoft appealed the district
court’s decision, stating the government seeks an impermissible extraterritorial
application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)102 and the Second
Circuit agreed, stating that warrant was invalid because of territoriality concerns.103
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¶44

Even more recently, since the early drafts of this comment, this issue received a lot
of media coverage in the government’s case against Apple to decrypt the phone of one of
the San Bernardino shooters. Like Microsoft, Apple is attempting to enforce the rights of
its users against the government’s security concerns. The F.B.I asked Apple to help
unlock the iPhone of one of the shooters who killed 14 people in San Bernardino,
California, Syed Rizwan Farook.104 Apple refused, which prompted the F.B.I to try to get
a court order to make Apple comply.105 A magistrate judge granted the order, requiring
Apple to aid the government to help bypass the auto-erase function if it was enabled, to
allow the government to try passcodes on the device without permanently locking and
without the additional delay usually in place on iPhones.106 Apple responded with a letter
to their customers that they plan to fight the order, stating that encryption helps the
security of personal information, which ultimately helps personal safety.107 Apple stated
that the F.B.I wanted them to build a backdoor and Apple warned that once this was
created, there would be no way to control its use – once the decryption key was created, it
could be used on any device.108
¶45
The courts have two options if they treat encrypted messages analogously to former
case law. They can either treat messages as a locked box (expectation of privacy) or like
a secret or coded communication (no expectation).109 They may also create a new
understanding instead of trying to force the technology onto older law.110 One hopes this
would be the outcome, as technology may not overlay perfectly with the more tangible
world the court hopes to compare it with.
B. Recommendations
¶46

Privacy should be weighed more heavily, especially when the only solutions at the
moment seem to be to either turn over entire email accounts or to turn over nothing at all.
At the risk of losing evidence, privacy should be the dominant concern, which has been
supported by the Supreme Court noting that “privacy comes at a cost”.111 There is no
need to expose all of one’s private and personal thoughts in email. Law enforcement
currently is required to stop listening on a wiretap when a conversation is irrelevant to
their investigation.112 Therefore, there is already a chance that law enforcement may be
missing pertinent information to their investigations.
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¶47

Law enforcement says encryption could keep them from uncovering a terrorist plot,
or prevent them from finding the organizers of domestic terrorism in the San Bernardino
Case. They cite to security concerns as the reason for their desire to get technology
companies to cooperate. However, there is another security interest that encryption helps,
rather than hinders: digital security. Encryption keeps people’s communications and
information private, thereby preventing hacking and other digital security risks. Opening
up the digital system to law enforcement is likely to open the system up to outside
hackers, interested in stealing people’s information and causing more crime even as law
enforcement tries to prevent it. Apple has cited to this exact reason in their response to
government pleas to decrypt the San Bernardino phone, highlighting industry fears.113
¶48
Law enforcement was previously able to get information on suspects, when
wiretaps had to be installed manually and officers had to physically be on surveillance.114
Law enforcement can get court permission to enter a home and plant a bug.115 This
requires more manpower than a typical wiretap, which can be accessed by a phone call to
a telecommunications company, but it also defeats any law enforcement argument that
without allowing wiretapping and warrants for encrypted information, the public will be
in danger.116 The court has preferred surveillance methods that uphold the Fourth
Amendment to those that are convenient.117
¶49
Some scholars have warned against ubiquitous encryption as a way to protect
privacy interests and deal with gaps in the statutory law, because it would force law
enforcement to use alternatives to wiretaps and warrants to gain the information such as
spyware installed on suspects’ computers, or electromagnetic surveillance.118 However,
this argument, while valid, is not correct. The move should be towards further encryption,
and further user protections. As this paper has shown, the statutory protections for
communications are outdated, and case law is divided across the county, without a real
trend emerging. Edward Snowden’s disclosures revealed the government is already using
illegal methods to discover information. Therefore, until the law becomes more settled
and modern, the best way to protect the user is to increase encryption and make it a
default setting. That will prevent companies from being able to send the information to
law enforcement, because they will be unable to get access themselves.
¶50
Admittedly, this will make digital surveillance more difficult, and thereby more
difficult for law enforcement to catch criminals, even including the terrorists often cited
113
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to in anti-privacy arguments. However, there are methods of surveillance that do not
involve complete access to written communications. There are methods which may
require more manpower, such as tailing or actual installation of recording equipment in a
home. Because these methods are obviously invasive, rather than subtly so, like
wiretapping or warrants for accounts or phones, and there is more case law on the right of
privacy in these types of surveillance, people’s right to privacy will be better protected.
For now, an open invitation to gain access to a person’s private thoughts and other data is
not acceptable, even at the risk of the decreased ability of law enforcement to have access
to information.

CONCLUSION
¶51

At the moment, privacy rights have the benefit of technology behind them. Many
communications are very difficult for law enforcement to investigate, especially in a live
feed via wiretapping, but also through warrants, as encrypted communications make it
increasingly difficult for companies to comply with warrants for their users’ account
information.
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